In April 2025, the High Court granted a final order restraining the two former associates of the applicant, part of a major financial group, from publishing or distributing defamatory statements about the company and its employees on social media or elsewhere. The judgment highlights the interplay between freedom of expression and the right to dignity and reputation, particularly in the context of former employees airing workplace grievances in the public domain.
The first respondent, a former branch manager of the applicant, and the second respondent, a former financial advisor of the applicant, made various statements on social media accusing the applicant and individuals associated with it of corruption, abuse, and other serious misconduct. The posts included allegations that the company was a “scam,” that one of its regional executives was a “woman abuser,” and that the applicant’s shareholder was complicit in misconduct.
The applicant applied to court for urgent relief, seeking an interdict prohibiting the respondents from continuing to publish such statements and compelling them to delete existing posts. The applicant contended that the allegations were false, defamatory, and intended to damage its reputation and business interests. The respondents admitted making the statements but argued that the publications were true, in the public interest, or amounted to fair comment. They claimed the statements arose out of their experiences of alleged unfair treatment and violations of their rights while associated with the applicant.
The court rejected these defences and held that, while individuals are entitled to freedom of expression, this right is not absolute and must be balanced against the right to dignity and reputation. The court emphasised that accusations of criminality, abuse, and corruption are serious and, without factual substantiation, cannot be justified as fair comment or truth published in the public interest.
In assessing the defence of truth and public interest, the court found that the respondents had failed to adduce any evidence to support their allegations. The judgment affirmed that defamatory statements that are not shown to be true, are not protected by the defence of public interest. The court reiterated the principle that publication of defamatory material cannot be justified in the absence of a demonstrable factual basis.
Regarding the defence of fair comment, the court found that the respondents had failed to distinguish clearly between factual assertions and opinions based on facts. Without identifying a factual foundation for the comments, the defence could not succeed. The language used by the respondents in describing the applicant as “trash,” and accusing individuals of being “woman abusers” and “aiding criminals” was held to be gratuitously insulting and lacking any rational connection to the alleged workplace grievances.
The court also dismissed the argument that a final interdict was inappropriate because the harm had already occurred. The court found that further harm was reasonably apprehended given the first respondent’s express refusal to desist and the second respondent’s continued publication after providing an undertaking to stop.
The judgment affirms that while individuals are entitled to express dissatisfaction with their employers, such expressions must be truthful, substantiated, and respectful of the rights of others. Social media is not a substitute for appropriate legal forums, such as the CCMA or Labour Court, particularly where reputational rights are at stake.
Liberty Group Limited v Chonco and Another (7449/24P) [2025] ZAKZPHC 27 (25 April 2025)