A September 2025 decision from the federal court in New Mexico confirmed that the effect of a standard policy exclusion that excluded loss caused by vandalism if the building had been vacant for more than 60 consecutive days turned on the presence of sufficient personal property to conduct the insured’s customary operations, rather than on whether the premises were actually in use at the time of the loss. The building was used for religious services and community programmes. Because furniture, equipment and religious items remained on site before and after two arson fires, the vacancy condition did not preclude cover for vandalism-related loss.

“Vacant” was defined as when the building “does not contain enough of your personal property to conduct customary operations.” The insurer argued that the premises were vacant because the insured had not used the building for operations for an extended period; alternatively, that a first fire left insufficient contents for operations before a second fire.

The court rejected both points. It emphasised the wording and stated that the definition looks only to the sufficiency of personal property on site, not whether operations are actually being conducted. The case law relied on by the insurer was distinguishable because those policies either lacked a definition or used definitions that included a “use” component. Here, the unambiguous definition asked one question: was there enough of the insured’s property in the building to conduct customary operations?

On the evidence, the answer was yes at the time of both fires. The insurer’s own loss adjuster reported that while the building was not actively used, there remained sufficient contents to continue normal operations. Testimony described tables, chairs, books, kitchen equipment, and religious items necessary for services and events, including after the first fire. Photographs cited by the insurer did not credibly show that a majority of tables and chairs were irreparably damaged. Under New Mexico law, arson is a form of vandalism, so the vacancy condition could have applied – had the building been vacant under the policy’s definition. It was not.

The court granted summary judgment for the insured on the coverage issue and declared that the policy responded to loss or damage from both fires.

Where a vacancy condition is tied to “enough personal property to conduct customary operations,” the focus is inventory, equipment, and setup – not actual use. Policy wording is critical: the court treated the definition as unambiguous and applied it as written, declining to read in a “use” requirement found in other policy forms. Adjuster assessments, inventories, and practical descriptions of what is on site will be decisive. Arguments that operations were paused or reduced will not carry the day if the contents on the premises are sufficient to resume operations, but different wording (for example, definitions that measure actual use or occupancy) may lead to a different outcome. The standard exclusion in South Africa refers to unoccupied buildings, which leads to its own factual enquiry.

Church Mutual Insurance Co. S.I. v. Chabad of New Mexico, No. 1:24-cv-00090