A general average claim will fail where the casualty is caused by an incompetent master, and the owner cannot prove due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. That was the finding of the Admiralty Court in January 2026, with the result that a cargo contribution of about USD 1.27 million was not recoverable.
The case concerned a bulk carrier that grounded off the Datça peninsula during a laden voyage. After a prolonged salvage and transhipment operation, the owners declared general average. Cargo interests, through their insurers, declined to contribute, relying on unseaworthiness and lack of due diligence. The court agreed.
The grounding itself was largely uncontroversial on the evidence. Public AIS data showed that, in the final hour before the casualty, the vessel departed from the passage plan, failed to record or plot position fixes, and continued at speed towards land. Shortly after nightfall, the master sent the lookout off the bridge, remained alone, missed a scheduled course alteration, and made no effective use of radar or bridge watch alarms. The vessel entered shallow water and grounded within seconds.
After the event, the deck log and engine log contained entries inconsistent with the AIS data. The court found these entries to be false and intended to deflect blame.
The central issue was whether this conduct amounted to incompetence rather than navigational negligence. The court accepted that a competent mariner can make mistakes, even serious ones. However, this was not an isolated lapse. The failures were numerous and removed the basic safeguards intended to ensure safe navigation. The judge described the conduct as a complete dereliction of duty.
Applying the established test of unseaworthiness, the court asked whether a prudent owner, knowing of the defect in the master’s competence, would have required it to be made good before sending the vessel to sea. On the facts, the answer was yes. The master’s incompetence rendered the vessel unseaworthy.
Once unseaworthiness was established, the burden shifted to the owners to prove that they had exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage. On this issue, the evidence fell short. The owners relied on certificates of competency, a general assertion of past satisfactory performance, and an undisclosed reference from a previous employer. There was no documentary evidence of vetting, supervision, or any meaningful investigation after the grounding. The court found that due diligence had not been proved.
Cargo interests relied on alleged defects in the vessel’s passage plan. While the plan was basic and lacked features often used in modern practice, both experts agreed that, if it had been followed, the grounding would not have occurred. The court confirmed that defects in passage planning must still be causative. On these facts, the passage plan did not, by itself, render the vessel unseaworthy or cause the grounding.
The commercial consequence was decisive. Because the casualty was caused by the carrier’s actionable fault, the general average claim failed in its entirety. The adjustment and quantum exercise became irrelevant.
For owners and managers, the lesson is clear. Crew competence, bridge discipline, and documentary proof of due diligence are central to seaworthiness. Certificates alone are not enough. If due diligence cannot be proved, general average may fail altogether.
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