Want to intervene in large merger proceedings? Here is what you must show.
In February 2026, the Constitutional Court confirmed the test for intervention in large merger proceedings. The court found that a prospective intervener must show either a material interest in the proceedings or a reasonable prospect of assisting the Competition Tribunal.
This case involved a retailer seeking to intervene in the proceedings of a large merger in the furniture sector. The retailer alleged that the merger raised concerns in the low‑ and medium‑income furniture market. The Tribunal granted limited intervention rights and later gave reasons for finding the retailer’s evidence useful.
On appeal, the Competition Appeal Court set aside the intervention decision and held that an intervener must show special or unique insights that could not be obtained elsewhere before being permitted to intervene.
On further appeal, the Constitutional Court rejected this approach as an impermissibly high threshold. It held that requiring special or unique insights is unworkable and inconsistent with the Tribunal’s inquisitorial powers. At the intervention stage, the Tribunal need not test the correctness of contested market allegations. The court also stressed that the Tribunal exercises a true discretion on intervention and that the Competition Appeal Court should be slow to interfere.
The Constitutional Court pointed out that the retailer provided more than general assertions. It advanced a merger‑specific theory of harm and submitted fact‑based material, such as maps, graphs and data. It also identified gaps in the investigation and explained the assistance it could offer. This satisfied the established test.
A further helpful feature of the judgment is its confirmation that the Tribunal may tailor the scope of intervention. In this matter the retailer was allowed to participate on specific competition issues only. The Tribunal refused intervention on other issues, including public interest matters. The Constitutional Court endorsed this careful and fact‑specific approach.
The full judgment can be accessed here: