This blog is co-authored by, Raaiqhah Akoo, candidate attorney.
In February 2026, the high court confirmed that allegations of racism and unethical conduct published on social media and in a letter to third parties cannot be justified as being in the public interest where there is no admissible evidence establishing their truth. In those circumstances, the court will order appropriate redress, including an interdict, a written retraction, and punitive costs.
The matter arose from statements published on Twitter/X alleging that a company had engaged in racist, sexist, and unethical conduct following the termination of a commercial relationship. In addition to the public posts, the respondents sent a letter to one of the company’s longstanding customers repeating those allegations and inviting scrutiny of the business relationship. Publication of both the posts and the letter was admitted.
The company approached the court for interdictory relief, arguing that continued publication threatened its reputation and commercial relationships, and that damages alone would not prevent further harm. An interim interdict was granted restraining the respondents from publishing defamatory statements about the company on social media or communicating such allegations to third parties.
The court applied established principles of defamation. It held that the statements were on the face of it defamatory. Once a defamatory publication is established, wrongfulness and intention are presumed, and the burden shifts to the respondent to prove a recognised defence.
The respondents relied on truth and public interest, reasonable publication, fair comment, and freedom of expression. The court rejected these defences, finding that no admissible evidence substantiated the allegations. Framing statements as “allegations” or “questions” did not change their meaning where, in context, they conveyed assertions of fact to an ordinary reader.
The requirements for a final interdict were satisfied. The company had a clear right to protect its reputation, actual and reasonably apprehended harm existed, and there was no adequate alternative remedy. Damages alone would not prevent continued publication.
The court placed particular emphasis on the letter sent to the company’s customer. This was not general commentary or public debate, but a targeted communication directed at an existing commercial relationship. In these circumstances, prohibiting further publication alone was insufficient. A written retraction was necessary to address the harm already caused.
The court ordered mandatory retractions of the defamatory material, together with punitive costs, and a final interdict restraining the respondents from publishing defamatory statements about the company on social media or communicating such allegations to third parties.
Whilst individuals and organisations are entitled to raise genuine concerns about corporate conduct, recognised defences such as truth or public interest must be supported by admissible evidence. Where a publisher fails to do so, allegations of racism, sexism or unethical conduct will be treated as defamatory, and courts may order written retractions of defamatory material and punitive costs in addition to interdictory relief to protect reputational and commercial interests. Publication on social media is no different from using any other media and may increase any damages awarded.
Barloworld South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Not in my Name International NPC and Others (2023/112452) [2026…